EXPERT DETERMINATION LEGAL RIGHTS OBJECTION
United States Postal Service v. WhitePages TLD LLC
Case No. LRO2013-0048

1. The Parties

The Objector/Complainant (“Objector”) is United States Postal Service of Washington, D.C., United States of America (“United States” or “U.S”), represented by Lewis and Roca LLP, United States.

The Applicant/Respondent (“Respondent”) is WhitePages TLD LLC of Seattle, Washington, United States, represented internally.

2. The applied-for gTLD string

The applied-for gTLD string is <.mail>.

3. Procedural History

The Legal Rights Objection (“Objection”) was filed by with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “WIPO Center”) on March 13, 2013 pursuant to the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (“the Procedure”).

In accordance with Article 9 of the Procedure, the WIPO Center completed the review of the Objection on March 26, 2013 and determined that the Objection complies with the requirements of the Procedure and the World Intellectual Property Organization Rules for New gTLD Dispute Resolution for Existing Legal Rights Objections (the WIPO Rules for New gTLD Dispute Resolution).

In accordance with Article 11(a) of the Procedure, the WIPO Center formally notified the Respondent of the Objection, and the proceedings commenced on April 18, 2013. In accordance with Article 11(b) and relevant communication provisions of the Procedure, the Response was timely filed with the WIPO Center on May 17, 2013.

The WIPO Center received on April 25, 2013 a proposal from the Objector to consolidate the Objection with the objections in cases LRO2013-0043 to LRO2013-0048. The Applicant expressed a willingness to consolidate, however other affected parties expressed opposition to aspects of the Objector’s consolidation proposal. In accordance with Article 12 of Procedure and Paragraph 7(d) of the WIPO Rules for New gTLD Dispute Resolution, the WIPO Center did not make a decision to consolidate the referenced LRO Objections.
for purposes of Article 12(b) of the Procedure.

The WIPO Center appointed William R. Towns, Maxim H. Waldbaum, and the Honorable Neil Brown Q.C as the Panel in this matter on June 14, 2013. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the WIPO Center to ensure compliance with Article 13(c) of the Procedure and Paragraph 9 of WIPO Rules for New gTLD Dispute Resolution.

The Objector on May 29, 2013 submitted to the Center an unsolicited Request for Additional Submissions to Supplement Legal Rights Objection ("Request for Additional Submissions"), seeking to submit survey evidence directed to the primary meaning of “mail” in the minds of the U.S. public and its association with the Objector. The Respondent on June 5, 2013 lodged with the Center an objection to the Objector’s Request for Additional Submission on various grounds. Subsequently, on July 10, 2013, the Objector submitted to the Center a Request for Hearing, asserting, inter alia, that the case involves novel issues and that the Panel would benefit from a further explanation of the Parties’ positions. The Respondent has submitted an objection to such request.

4. Factual Background

The Objector is the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). The Objector, an independent establishment of the Executive Branch of the United States Government, is one of the world’s largest mail carriers, delivering 40% of the world’s mail. The Objector and its predecessor have delivered mail to residences and businesses in the United States for more than 235 years. Currently this includes 152 million homes, businesses, and Post Office boxes.

The Objector owns a considerable number of composite trademark registrations in the United States and numerous other countries comprised in part of the word “mail”. Public documents available on the USPTO TESS database indicate that the Objector is the owner of forty-eight (48) current United States registrations for composite “mail”-containing trademarks in International Classes 35 and 39 covering mail delivery and other related postal services. These include trademark registrations for U.S. MAIL & Design, U.S. MAIL MR. ZIP & Design, and UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE U.S. MAIL & Design (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “U.S. MAIL” marks). The Objector owns registrations for more than twenty other composite marks containing the word “mail”, including: AIR MAIL; BECAUSE THE MAIL MATTERS; BUSINESS REPLY MAIL; CERTIFIED MAIL; CRITICAL MAIL; EVERY DOOR DIRECT MAIL; EXPRESS MAIL; EXPRESS MAIL INTERNATIONAL; FIRST-CLASS MAIL; FIRST-CLASS MAIL INTERNATIONAL; FRIEND-TO-FRIEND MAIL; GLOBAL EXPRESS MAIL; GLOBAL PRIORITY MAIL; INTELLIGENT MAIL; MEDIA MAIL; PRIORITY MAIL; PRIORITY MAIL INTERNATIONAL; STANDARD MAIL; TODAY’S MAIL; and MAIL MOMENT.

Public documents available through the USPTO TESS database reflect that the Objector has disclaimed “the exclusive right to use ‘MAIL’ apart from the mark as shown” in all but eight (8) of the forty-eight (48) United States registrations referred to above. A “disclaimer” is a statement in the trademark application

1 This factual recitation is based on the parties’ allegations, the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, and the Panel’s independent review of public documents available through the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) Trademark Electronic Search System ("TESS") database, and of the Objector’s website.

record that the applicant does not claim exclusive rights to an unregistrable component of a mark, which includes wording that is merely descriptive or generic with respect to the claimed goods and services. See Defender Security Company v. Lifestyle Domain Holdings, Inc., WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0035. The trademarks and pending applications in which such disclaimers have been made include U.S. MAIL\(^3\), CERTIFIED MAIL, EXPRESS MAIL, PRIORITY MAIL, CRITICAL MAIL, INTELLIGENT MAIL, STANDARD MAIL, GLOBAL EXPRESS MAIL, GLOBAL PRIORITY MAIL, and FIRST-CLASS MAIL. The Objector has not applied for and does not own a trademark registration for MAIL alone.

The Objector submitted definitions of the word “mail” derived from various online dictionaries as an annex to the Objection.\(^4\) Dictionary definitions provide an indication of how words are used by the public in everyday situations. In many instances a word may have multiple meanings, and dictionaries often list each meaning in order of most common usage. The dictionary definitions proffered by the Objector indicate that “mail” is commonly used as a noun in reference to letters and packages conveyed by the postal service, in reference to the postal service, to the delivery of mail, and to email, generally in that order. “Mail” also is used as a verb in relation to sending a letter or package through the postal system, or sending email.

The Respondent is a limited liability company organized and existing under the Laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Seattle, Washington, United States of America. The Respondent’s new gTLD application for the string <.mail> was originally posted on June 13, 2012, under Application ID: 1-1906-88399. The Respondent states that its mission for the applied-for gTLD is “to create a recognizable, viable, and profitable extension to bring individuals and companies that are passionate about self-identifying themselves in the mail community.” The Respondent further explains that it is creating the opportunity for Internet users to identify websites that operate in or around mail in a “highly descriptive TLD”, without needing “to identify to the left of the dot they are working primarily with email (or mail).”

The Respondent indicates its expectation that the gTLD <.mail> extension will be used primarily by organizations that send and receive email, but given “the expansiveness and diversity of what constitutes mail” the Respondent will adopt an open registration policy. To address abusive second level registrations, the Respondent represents that it will fully implement all protection mechanisms developed by ICANN for the new gTLDs.\(^5\) The Respondent submits that the applied-for gTLD <.mail> extension, “though broadly defined by the wide spectrum of what constitutes mail, is largely self-explanatory and its content readily apparent to both potential registrants and end-consumers.”

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\(^4\) Objection, Annex 9.

\(^5\) Fourteen new measures have been developed by ICANN for new gTLDs:

1. Controls to ensure proper access to domain management functions;
2. 24/7/365 abuse point of contact at registry;
3. Procedures for handling complaints of illegal or abusive activity, including remediation and takedown processes;
4. Thick WhoIs;
5. Use of the Trademark Clearinghouse;
6. A Sunrise process;
7. A Trademark Claims process;
8. Adherence to the Uniform Rapid Suspension system;
9. Adherence to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy;
10. Adherence to the Post Delegation Dispute Resolution Policy;
11. Detailed security policies and procedures;
12. Strong security controls for access, threat analysis and audit;
13. Implementation DNSSEC; and
5. Preliminary Issues

A. Objector’s Request for Additional Submissions and Evidence

As noted above, the Objector on May 29, 2013 submitted to the Center a Request for Additional Submissions, seeking the admission of survey evidence to supplement its Objection, directed to the primary meaning of “mail” in the minds of the U.S. public and its association with the Objector. The Objector asserts that the Panel should accept the survey and accompanying report of the Objector’s marketing research expert as “rebuttal” evidence with respect the Respondent’s “incorrect assumption” that “Mail…is not a source, but a word to describe a means of communication … not associated exclusively with the Postal Service.” The Respondent objected to the Request for Additional Submissions on grounds, inter alia, that the Objector’s survey evidence should have been included with its Objection, and that no good cause, necessity, or extraordinary circumstances support the Objector’s additional submission in the absence of a request by the Panel.

The Procedure envisages the submission of an objection and a response, with the possibility of additional written submissions and additional evidence addressed in Article 17 and 18 of the Procedure, respectively. No party has a right to insist upon the admission of additional arguments or evidence. See TLDDOT GmbH v. InterNetWire Web-Development GmbH, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0052. Section 3.4.5 of the gTLD Applicant Guidebook (v. 2012-06-04) (“Guidebook”) underscores that the process is intended “to achieve the goal of resolving disputes rapidly and at reasonable cost.” Article 17 of the Procedure provides that the Panel “may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and Response.” Article 18 of the Procedure specifically limits the authority of the Panel to require a party to submit additional evidence to “exceptional cases”, in order to achieve the goal of resolving disputes over new gTLDs rapidly and at reasonable cost. In all cases, it is incumbent on the Panel to “ensure that the parties are treated with equality, and that each party is given a reasonable opportunity to present its position.” Article 4(e) of the Procedure.

The Panel concurs that no party to a Legal Rights Objection has an unfettered right to insist upon the admission of additional arguments or evidence. The Panel nonetheless considers it within an expert panel’s discretion under Article 17 to accept or reject a supplemental submission made by a party, regardless whether the panel has specifically requested that submission. See Express, LLC v. Sea Sunset, LLC, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0022. In the exercise of such discretion, the expert panel should consider whether the admission of an unsolicited additional submission sought by a party will unduly or unnecessarily frustrate ICANN’s clearly stated goal of resolving disputes over new gTLDs rapidly and at reasonable cost. Further, before accepting an unsolicited additional submission the expert panel ordinarily should consider whether, after review of the objection and response, each party has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to present its position. In a situation such as here, where a party’s unsolicited additional submission is primarily directed to additional evidence, this Panel considers that the moving party bears the burden to meet the “exceptional case” requirement of Article 18. See United States Postal Service v. Amazon EU S.à.r.l, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0044.

Applying these concepts, the Panel finds that the Objector has not met the “exceptional case” requirement of Article 18 respecting the proffered survey evidence. As noted earlier, the Objector’s survey is directed to the primary meaning of “mail” in the minds of the U.S. public and its association with the Objector. In its Objection the USPS presented arguments in support of its position, and submitted evidence as to the primary meaning of the term “mail”, including dictionary definitions. To the extent that the Objector may wish to rely on the survey as evidence that “mail” has secondary meaning as a distinctive identifier of its services, the Objector was required to submit the source and documentation of any existing legal rights the Objector claims are infringed with the Objection.6 The Objector had the opportunity at first instance to obtain and

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6 As discussed further below, in order to establish standing as a “rightsholder” within the meaning of Section 3.2 of the Guidebook, the source and documentation of the existing legal rights the Objector is claiming are infringed must be included with the Objector’s filing, i.e., the Objection.
submit with its Objection a survey, if so desired. In view of the foregoing, the Objector’s characterization of the survey as “rebuttal” evidence is unpersuasive.

In sum, the Panel finds that the Objector has been afforded a reasonable opportunity in this proceeding to present its position, and to identify the source of and document its existing legal rights. Further, the Panel concludes that the Objection and Response provide the Panel with sufficient evidence and argument to determine the nature and source of the Objector’s existing legal rights. See United States Postal Service v. Amazon EU S.à.r.l, supra. In light of the foregoing, the Panel considers that granting the Objector’s Request for Additional Submissions would unduly and unnecessarily impede the expressed goal of the Procedure to resolve new gTLD disputes rapidly and at a reasonable cost. Accordingly, the Objector’s request is denied.

B. Objector’s Request for Hearing

Article 19 of the Procedure provides that the Panel may decide, on its own or at the request of a party, to hold a hearing only in “extraordinary circumstances”. Nothing in the record of this case suggests to the Panel that such extraordinary circumstances are present. The Objector’s averments that the issues in this proceeding are novel and that the Panel would benefit from conducting a hearing carry little weight with this Panel. It appears that the primary impetus for the Objector in requesting a hearing was a desire to present arguments and testimony to explain the meaning of the Objector’s survey. The Panel, even had it accepted the Objector’s proffered survey evidence, would find nothing extraordinary about the circumstances of this case justifying a hearing, which clearly would build significant delay and further cost into this proceeding. As noted earlier, the Objector had an opportunity to undertake its survey and submit the report of its expert with the filing of its Objection. The Objector’s Request for Hearing is denied.

6. Parties’ Contentions

A. Objector

The Objector maintains that the string for which the Respondent has applied will take unfair advantage of the distinctive character and reputation of the Objector’s marks, unjustifiably impair the distinctive character or reputation of the Objector’s marks, and create an impermissible likelihood of confusion between the applied-for string and the Objector’s marks. The Objector claims ownership of more than 240 trademark registrations worldwide for marks that include “mail” together with other terms. The Objector submits that awarding the .<mail> gTLD string to the Respondent would interfere with its rights in each and every one of these marks, but for sake of brevity the Objection refers primarily to its U.S. MAIL mark. The Objector asserts that the applied-for gTLD <.mail> string is confusingly similar to the Objector’s U.S. MAIL mark, which the Objector represents has been used since at least as early as 1819, is a famous mark, and is also part of the USPS’ official seal, which is protected as a state emblem by Article 6ter of the Paris Convention.

The Objector argues that “mail” cannot be viewed as a simple common term in the context of the applied-for gTLD string. The Objector maintains that in this context “mail” will have a source-indicating meaning and that U.S. consumers will expect the .<mail> gTLD to be controlled by the Objector, as the regulated entity and designated postal operator entrusted to deliver mail in the United States. While the Objector

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7 The panel in United States Postal Service v. Amazon EU S.à.r.l, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0044 determined that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the admission of the objector’s survey evidence at issue here. The panel concluded the survey evidence addressed a matter raised in the original objection. The panel further found that the survey did not directly address the objector’s legal rights or recognition of its trademarks, but rather concerned an alleged association of the word “mail” with the objector in the United States. The panel observed: ”[i]t does not necessarily follow that the fact that consumers associate ‘mail’ with the Objector means that the Objector has any legal rights in the word ‘mail’”. The panel concluded that both parties had an equal opportunity to present their positions on the association of the objector with “mail” in the United States, and that the objection and response provided sufficient evidence and argument to identify the nature of the objector’s legal rights.
acknowledges that the term “mail” has several different meanings in English, the Objector submits that dictionary definitions demonstrate that the primary meaning of “mail” is hard-copy correspondence delivered through a postal service, which in the United States is the Objector. This is reinforced, according to the Objector, by encyclopedia entries for “mail” reflecting the common understanding of the term, and by references in one or more state statutes to “mail” as “use of the United States Postal Service for delivery of letters, packages or other containers.”

The Objector also asserts that the <.mail> gTLD is likely to be seen as source-indicating by comparison to the sponsored TLDs <.gov>, <.int>, and <.post>. The Objector submits that each of these sponsored TLDs is known by the public to be regulated and accordingly is afforded a greater level of trust than are generic TLDs. According to the Objector, given consumer association of “mail” with the Objector, consumers are likely to view the <.mail> gTLD as controlled by the Objector, especially since mail delivery is an essential government service. The Objector argues that the risk of confusion will be increased because the <.mail> gTLD is likely to be viewed as the equivalent of the <.post> sponsored TLD sponsored by the Universal Postal Union (“UPU”), a specialized agency of the United Nations that represents the world’s postal community. The Objector notes that the United States is a member of the UPU.

The Objector maintains that protection of seemingly common terms such as mail has been internationally recognized in certain circumstances, citing to a 2010 ruling of the German Federal Patent Court that “post” is source-indicative to German consumers, who associate it with Deutsche Post. According to the Objector, the public’s association between the Objector and “mail” is further heightened by the Objector’s ownership of trademark registrations in more than twenty variations that include the word “mail.”

The Objector argues that the <.mail> gTLD string will create an impermissible likelihood of confusion for U.S. consumers, and that such confusion will be impermissible because of the severity of harm such confusion may generate in various forms. First, the Objector submits that the <.mail> gTLD will create impermissible confusion in the form of a false sense of privacy and security in <.mail> domains and emails. According to the Objector, U.S. consumers rely on well-known standards of privacy and security for their “mail” because the USPS, a quasi-governmental entity, is subject to government regulation and its handling of the nation’s mail is governed by federal statutes and regulations. The Objector maintains that the U.S. public’s trust is reflected in its consistently high rankings in Ponemon Institute’s “20 Most Trusted Companies for Privacy” surveys. The Objector concludes that awarding the <.mail> gTLD application to the Respondent or any other private sector applicant is likely to confuse the U.S. public into giving <.mail> domains and emails a similar level of trust as they afford their “mail.”

Equally concerning to the Objector is the possibility that the Objector’s numerous trademarks that contain “mail” could be reflected in corresponding second level domain names or email addresses. The Objector asserts these could include <us.mail>, <certified.mail>, <priority.mail>, <express.mail>, to name a few. According to the Objector, it would have no control over the content of these domains or the quality of any goods and services offered through them. The Objector asserts that the Respondent intends to use the <.mail> gTLD primarily for email addresses. The Objector warns that unregulated <.mail> email addresses will be prime tools for fraudulent and criminal activity, citing as an example of such possible email address “info@us.mail”. The Objector argues that consumers are vulnerable to such schemes because they expect to receive email communications from the USPS, and that the existing gTLD Rights Protection Mechanisms are completely inadequate to prevent such confusion.

The Objector contends that the Respondent’s purported or intended use of the applied-for gTLD string will interfere with the Objector’s legitimate exercise of its rights. According to the Objector, the Respondent’s intended use of the gTLD <.mail> string to create an extension to bring together individuals and companies that are passionate about self-identifying themselves in the “mail community” will create a false association between Respondent and the Objector, since the Objector is viewed as the source of “mail,” and the Respondent is not a member of the “mail community.” According to the Objector, the “mail community” consists of the Posts authorized by the 192 Member Countries of the Universal Postal Union to deliver the “mail.”
The Objector submits that nothing will prevent third parties from registering second level domain names in that applied-for <.mail> gTLD that directly infringe the Objector's marks, and email addresses created in connection with any of these domain names would also directly infringe the Objector's marks. The Objector submits the Respondent's operation of the <.mail> gTLD will open the door to fraud, scamming, phishing, and other false or misleading schemes directed at consumers who will mistakenly believe these infringing domain names and/or email addresses are associated with the USPS.

The Objector expresses particular concern with the Respondent's intended use of the applied-for gTLD <.mail> string with the creation of email accounts. The Objector states that the Respondent intends to target the <.mail> gTLD at email service providers and their customers. Although the Objector maintains that the term “mail” is primarily used and recognized to refer to hard-copy correspondence rather than email, the Objector acknowledges “[w]ithout question, in the current climate of electronic correspondence, electronic communications via email are services that are closely related to hard copy correspondence.” The Objector asserts that such services are a natural area of expansion for the USPS and that the Respondent should be prohibited from trading on the Objector's reputation built over the course of almost 200 years. The Objector further submits that email is an integral part of the USPS' business because it communicates with customers via email in connection with a variety of its services.

The Objector contends that the applied-for gTLD string, if delegated, is likely to dilute the Objector's rights in its U.S. MAIL marks, which the Objector asserts are famous in the United States as household words. Further, the Objector reiterates its view that domain names and emails associated with the <.mail> gTLD are more open to fraud and phishing schemes because they are not regulated, and may mistakenly be attributed to the Objector, resulting in tarnishment of its U.S. MAIL marks.

The Objector represents that to its knowledge the Respondent does not have marks or other intellectual property rights in the term “mail”, and is not commonly known by “mail” or a name including the word “mail.”

B. Respondent

The Respondent submits that its intended use of the applied-for gTLD <.mail> will not take unfair advantage of the distinctive character and reputation of the Objector's marks, unjustifiably impair the distinctive character or reputation of the Objector's marks, or create an impermissible likelihood of confusion between the applied-for string and the Objector's marks. The Respondent maintains that, despite the Objector's assertions to the contrary, the public does not associate the term “mail”, when used in the context of the Internet, primarily with the USPS. Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the public is unlikely to expect the <.mail> gTLD to originate from the Objector.

While the Respondent acknowledges that the term “mail” traditionally refers to “matter physically delivered by the Postal Service”, the Respondent argues this is only true because for much of its history the Objector was the primary means of sending such communications. The Respondent asserts that times have changed, that email is displacing physical mail as the primary means of communicating, and that private mail deliverers are challenging the USPS' position as the primary deliverer of physical communications in the United States. The Respondent asserts that in the last decade first-class mailings through the USPS have dropped by half, which is confirmed by information made available on the Objector’s website. According to the Respondent, it is not a coincidence that this decline has been coextensive with the rise of the Internet, and electronic mail specifically, as a means of communication.

The Respondent acknowledges that many dictionaries continue to provide a definition of “mail” as material sent using a postal system, but observes that most dictionaries, including dictionaries relied on by the Objector, also define “mail” to include electronic mail (or email). The Respondent argues that the Objector’s attempt to dismiss such definitions “as a less common meaning of “mail”” completely ignores the context in which the gTLD <.mail> string will be used — namely, the Internet. According to the Respondent, when the term “mail” is used in the context of the Internet (and therefore domain names and email addresses), there can be no doubt that consumers associate “mail” with electronic mail and not physical mail.
The Respondent submits that the association of "mail" with electronic mail in an Internet context is demonstrated in a number of ways. First, the Respondent observes that many popular electronic mail service providers use the term "mail" within their names, including Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, AOL Mail, ZOHO Mail, Mail.com, and GMX Mail. In addition, the Respondent argues that the Objector's provision of postal services to roughly "152 million homes, businesses and Post Office boxes" pales in comparison to the number of users of electronic mail service worldwide. Relying primarily on statistics compiled by web analytics company comScore, the Respondent submits that Gmail's unique monthly visitors in June 2012, totaled 289 million (Google claimed 425 million active monthly users), that Hotmail had 325 million unique monthly visitors, and that Yahoo! Mail totaled 298 million monthly users.

Given the presence of Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, AOL Mail, ZOHO Mail, Mail.com, GMX Mail, and other similar electronic mail services, the Respondent maintains that the public has become accustomed to thinking of electronic mail as "mail" when the term is used in the context of the Internet. The Respondent also maintains that online search engine results for "mail" demonstrate that in the Internet context electronic mail is the relevant topic, in that the search engine results are dominated by electronic mail service providers, and not the Objector or other physical delivery services.

The Respondent further argues that the word "mail" is not primarily associated with the Objector even outside the Internet context. According to the Respondent, there are many businesses that provide "private mail" services. The Respondent notes that the United States Census Bureau recognizes the existence of "private mail centers", and that the United States Department of Commerce refers in publications to "private mail carriers", which are defined as "any vendor providing courier services except the United States Postal Service."

The Respondent represents that a search of the USPTO TESS database reveals nearly four hundred (400) registrations for trademarks that include the word "mail" owned by persons or entities other than the Objector. The Respondent asserts that the Objector's ownership of a number of registrations of mark that include the word "mail" is not evidence of "the public association between the Postal Service and 'mail'." The Respondent also observes that the majority of the Objector's trademark registrations disclaim the exclusive right to use the word "mail." The Respondent submits this is an acknowledgment by the Objector that the word "mail" is a generic or descriptive term, available for use by anyone, and not associated exclusively with the USPS, citing Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int'l, Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Once a disclaimer is effected an applicant has no exclusive rights to the disclaimed component apart from the composite mark").

The Respondent contends that none of the Objector's numerous composite marks that combine the term "mail" with other terms, including the Objector's U.S. MAIL marks, alter the fact that the word "mail", standing alone and unqualified by other words or designs, cannot be monopolized by the USPS. The Respondent submits that while U.S. MAIL may call to mind for consumers the Objector, this does not mean that the <.mail> gTLD will be associated with the Objector. The Respondent argues that the possibility that its use of the <.mail> gTLD might result in domains and emails that correspond to any of the Objector's registered marks is not relevant to the likelihood of confusion issue as framed in in Module 3 of the Guidebook, and that multiple levels of rights protection mechanisms will be available to address second level domain name registrations that potentially might infringe the Objector's registered marks.

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8 Response, Annex 4 (Gmail finally blows past Hotmail to become the world’s largest email service, Venture Beat, http://venturebeat.com/2012/06/28/gmail-hotmail-yahoo-email-users”).

9 Response, Annex 3 (Chrome & Apps@ Google I/O: Your web, everywhere, "http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/chrome-apgs-google-io-yourweb.html").

10 Response, Annex 5 (Search engine results for "mail").


In view of this, the Respondent dismisses as a "straw argument" the Objector's assertion that "unregulated" .mail email addresses will be prime tools for fraudulent or criminal activity. Similarly, the Respondent dismisses the Objector's reliance on the sponsored TLD .gov for the proposition that the gTLD .mail will be seen as an indicator of source, asserting that any such recognition arises from the exclusive use limitations for .gov as established under federal law. Finally, the Respondent notes that the United States Department of Commerce, in a letter to ICANN dated April 2, 2013, represented that the U.S. Government does not share the Objector's position regarding any of the pending applications for the .mail gTLD. This revelation, according to the Respondent, should dissipate any uncertainty as to whether the Objection in this case is well founded.

7. Discussion and Findings

As set forth in Module 3 of the Guidebook, the new gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure is triggered by a formal objection to a gTLD application by a third party. A formal objection can be filed on one of four enumerated grounds described in Section 3.2.1 of the Guidebook. A Legal Rights Objection is one of those grounds. Under Article 2(e)(ii) of the Procedure, a Legal Rights Objection is defined as an objection that the string comprising a potential new gTLD infringes existing third-party legal rights that are recognized or enforceable under generally accepted and internationally recognized principles of law.

Objectors must satisfy standing requirements to have their objections considered. Section 3.2.2.2 of the Guidebook provides that only a "rightsholder" has standing to object on the grounds that its existing legal rights are infringed by the applied-for gTLD. The source and documentation of the existing legal rights the objector is claiming are infringed must be included in the filing. Id. Such legal rights may include rights asserted in either registered or unregistered trademarks. Id. The expert panel presiding over the case is responsible under Section 3.2.2 of the Guidebook for determining whether the standing requirements have been met.

As provided for in Section 3.5.2 of the Guidebook, an expert panel presiding over a Legal Rights Objection will consider whether, under generally accepted and internationally recognized principles of law, the applied-for gTLD takes unfair advantage of or unjustifiably impairs the distinctive character of the objector's registered or unregistered mark, IGO name or acronym, or otherwise creates an impermissible likelihood of confusion between the applied-for gTLD and the objector's mark, IGO name, or acronym. In reaching a determination respecting trademark rights, the expert panel is to be guided by eight non-exclusive factors set out in Section 3.5.2 of the Guidebook. Pursuant to Section 3.5 of the Guidebook, the Objector bears the burden of proof as to all elements of its legal rights objection.

A. Objector's Standing Requirement

1. MAIL as a Stand-Alone Mark

The Objector does not own word or design trademark registrations consisting solely of MAIL, and no evidence of the Objector's use of MAIL as a stand-alone mark for its services has been presented to the Panel. As noted earlier, the Objector has disclaimed exclusive rights in "mail" in the vast majority of its U.S. registrations for composite marks that include the term. While the Objector urges that the U.S. public overwhelmingly recognizes the primary meaning of "mail" as hard-copy correspondence and associates it with the Objector, "mail" is a generic term for letters and packages conveyed by a postal service, and sending letters and packages through a postal system. As such, any public association of the term "mail" with the Objector does not demonstrate that the public recognizes "mail" as the mark of the Objector. "[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name." Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting

World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).

The survey evidence sought to be admitted by the Objector does not establish otherwise. The report of the Objector’s expert concluded that the primary meaning of the term “mail” to a majority of adults in the United States is hardcopy correspondence related to the USPS. As discussed above, the Panel has decided not to accept the Objector’s Request for Additional Submission and Evidence. Nevertheless, the Panel finds that the Objector’s survey evidence does not establish otherwise.

The report of the Objector’s expert concluded that the primary meaning of the term “mail” to a majority of adults in the United States is hardcopy correspondence related to the USPS. As discussed above, the Panel has decided not to accept the Objector’s Request for Additional Submission and Evidence. Nevertheless, the Panel finds that the Objector’s survey evidence does not establish otherwise.

A claim by the Objector to exclusive rights to use “mail” is inconsistent with the Objector’s disclaimer of “mail”, as well as with coexisting U.S. registrations of composite “mail” marks owned by third parties such as Federal Express, the United Parcel Service, and DHL, in which exclusive rights to “mail” also are disclaimed.

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Objector has not demonstrated existing legal rights in MAIL as a stand-alone mark for purposes of this proceeding.

2. U.S. MAIL and Other Composite MAIL Marks

The Objector has submitted evidence of United States trademark registrations for U.S. MAIL. These are marks in which the text U.S. MAIL is part of composite designs including other elements. The Objector also has submitted evidence of United States registrations for other composite marks including “mail”. The Panel finds that the Objector has demonstrated existing legal rights in U.S. MAIL and in other composite marks other composite marks that include the word “mail” sufficient to establish standing for purposes of its Objection.

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Objector has standing to bring this Objection.

B. The Panel’s Multi-Factor Analysis

Where the Objection is based on trademark rights, Section 3.5.2 of the Guidebook directs the Panel to consider eight non-exclusive factors in connection with the determination of whether the objection should be sustained. It is to be noted that the eight factors are not a scorecard and that a panel’s view on them does not, by itself, determine the outcome of the Objection, but, rather, that they are factors to be considered. The Panel addresses these factors below.

14 The Panel in United States Postal Service v. Amazon EU S.à.r.l, supra, also came to this conclusion after considering substantially the same arguments and evidence advanced by the Objector in this proceeding. Refer to Note 8 supra.


16 United Parcel Services of America, Inc. (UPS) owns United States trademark registrations for UPS MAIL LOGIC, U.S. Reg. No. 2,671,437, issued January 7, 2003, for “parcel and personal property sorting services” in International Class 35 and services including “transportation and delivery of packages and personal property by air, rail, boat and motor vehicle” in International Class 39, and UPS MAIL INNOVATIONS, U.S. Reg. No. 2,971,164, issued July 19, 2005, for services including “preparing online status reports regarding the tracking of mail and packages” in International Class 35 and services including “expedited document, package and personal property delivery by air, rail, boat and motor vehicles” in International Class 39.

17 Deutsche Post AG (DHL) owns United States trademark registrations for GLOBAL MAIL PARCEL, U.S. Reg. No. 2,808,405, and GLOBAL MAIL BUSINESS, U.S. Reg. No. 2,808,406, both issued on January 27, 2004, for services in International Class 39 including “postal services, namely, transport and delivery of letters, parcels, and small packets for third parties.” Federal Express, UPS and DHL have disclaimed the exclusive right to use “mail” apart from the marks as shown. The Objector maintains that Federal Express and UPS use these marks only in connection with partnering arrangements with USPS, and only with mail originating from USPS.
(i) Whether the applied-for gTLD is identical or similar, including in appearance, phonetic sound, or meaning, to the Objector’s existing mark.

The Panel finds that the applied-for gTLD string <.mail> is similar to appearance to the Objector’s U.S. MAIL word and design marks and to other composite MAIL marks held by the Objector to the extent the text of the applied-for gTLD string appears in its entirety in the Objector’s marks.

(ii) Whether the Objector’s acquisition and use of rights in the mark has been bona fide.

The Panel finds from the evidence in the record that the Objector’s acquisition and use of its trademark rights in its U.S. MAIL marks and in various other composite MAIL marks has been bona fide.

(iii) Whether and to what extent there is recognition in the relevant sector of the public of the sign corresponding to the gTLD, as the mark of the Objector, of the Respondent, or of a third party.

The Panel finds no indication in the record that that the Objector, the Respondent, or any third party have acquired recognizable or enforceable trademark rights in the term “mail” in itself through registration or by virtue of public recognition of “mail” as a distinctive indicator of the source of the party’s goods or services. The Panel’s search of public documents available on the USPTO TESS database disclosed no existing registrations for MAIL (i.e., as a stand-alone mark).

(iv) Respondent’s intent in applying for the gTLD, including whether the Respondent, at the time of application for the gTLD, had knowledge of the Objector’s mark, or could not have reasonably been unaware of that mark, and including whether the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of conduct whereby it applied for or operates TLDs or registrations in TLDs which are identical or confusingly similar to the marks of others.

The Respondent’s expressed intent in applying for the <.mail> gTLD string is to operate an open registry based on a descriptive or dictionary use of “mail”, primarily in relation to email, and there is no indication in the record that the Respondent’s intent is otherwise. The Respondent has not indicated whether it had knowledge of the Objector’s marks, but the Panel considers it unlikely that the Objector would have been unaware of the Objector and its U.S. MAIL marks. As noted by the Panel in United States Postal Service v. Amazon EU S.à.r.l, supra, an applicant for a new gTLD can be assumed to have made a trademark search on the proposed string, which in this case would have revealed the Objector’s U.S. MAIL marks and other MAIL-containing composite marks. Regardless, the Panel finds no evidence in the record indicating that the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of applying for new gTLD strings that are identical or confusingly similar to the marks of others.

(v) Whether and to what extent the Respondent has used, or has made demonstrable preparations to use, the sign corresponding to the gTLD in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a bona fide provision of information in a way that does not interfere with the legitimate exercise by the objector of its mark rights.

There is no indication in the record that the Respondent, either before or since applying for the <.mail> gTLD string, has used or made demonstrable preparation to use the sign corresponding to the applied-for gTLD. The Panel notes that the Respondent has invested time, money, technical and other resources in planning and preparing to use <.mail>. The Respondent submits that its use of the dictionary word “mail” as a gTLD will not interfere with the Objector’s legitimate exercise of its trademark rights. The Panel further notes, as discussed earlier, the additional rights protection mechanisms mandated by ICANN respecting all new gTLDs.18

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18 Refer to Note 5 and accompanying text supra.
(vi) Whether the Respondent has marks or other intellectual property rights in the sign corresponding to the gTLD, and, if so, whether any acquisition of such a right in the sign, and use of the sign, has been *bona fide*, and whether the purported or likely use of the gTLD by the Respondent is consistent with such acquisition or use.

There is no indication in the record that the Respondent has marks or other intellectual property rights in any sign corresponding to the applied-for gTLD <.mail> string.

(vii) Whether and to what extent the Respondent has been commonly known by the sign corresponding to the gTLD, and if so, whether any purported or likely use of the gTLD by the Respondent is consistent therewith and *bona fide*.

There is no indication in the record that the Respondent has been commonly known by a sign corresponding to the applied-for gTLD <.mail> string.

(viii) Whether the Respondent’s intended use of the gTLD would create a likelihood of confusion with the Objector’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the gTLD.

The Panel in assessing this non-exclusive factor considers whether the Respondent’s intended use of the applied-for gTLD string would create a likelihood of confusion between the gTLD and the marks in which the Objector has demonstrated existing legal rights. The issue as framed is whether the Respondent’s prospective use of the gTLD <.mail> is likely to cause confusion with the Objector’s marks as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the gTLD.

As noted above, the Respondent’s expressed intention is to use the <.mail> gTLD string in the context of an open registry, based on the descriptive or dictionary meaning of “mail”, primarily in association with email. While the Panel may accept for purposes of its present analysis that some members of the U.S. public associate the term “mail” with the Objector (although not necessarily residents in countries other than the United States), the Panel does not accept as tenable the Objector’s position that the Respondent’s use of the <.mail> gTLD string as described above will be systematically misperceived as an indicator of source for the Objector’s services. The Panel considers the term “mail” to be merely descriptive generic respecting some of the Objector’s services, and likely incapable of serving by itself as a distinctive indicator of source.

The Panel considers that the prospective use of the applied-for gTLD string with an open registry admits of the possibility for second level domain name registrations and email addresses corresponding to the Objector’s trademarks. Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence that the potential for such second level name registrations is likely to result in systemic trademark abuse, the Panel does not find that the mere possibility of such a risk demonstrates a likelihood of confusion between the applied-for gTLD string and the Objector’s marks. The Panel further notes that the rights protective mechanisms mandated by ICANN for all new gTLDs, largely overlooked by the Objector, afford an additional degree of protection against abusive second level domain registrations. See *Defender Security Company v. Baxter Pike LLC*, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0031.

In the final analysis, “mail” is a descriptive or generic term when used in relation to the Objector’s services, and the Objector does not have an exclusive right to use “mail” in a descriptive or generic sense. Given the Respondent’s stated intention is to use the applied-for gTLD <.mail> in connection to the descriptive or dictionary meaning of “mail” as email, the Panel finds that the intended use of the applied-for gTLD <.mail> is unlikely to cause confusion with the Objector’s marks as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the gTLD. As the United States Supreme Court noted in *KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.*, 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004): “If any confusion results, that is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that uses a well-known descriptive phrase.” See also *Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.*, 469 U. S. 189, 201 (1985) (noting safeguards in Lanham Act to prevent commercial monopolization of language); *Car-Freshner Corp. v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.*, 70 F. 3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting importance of “protect[ing] the right of society at large to use words or images in their primary descriptive sense”). As the Supreme Court explained in *KP Permanent Make-Up,
C. Panel's Findings

As has already been noted, the eight factors discussed above are not exclusive, and are not intended as a rote checklist. The relative importance of individual factors may vary with the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and it is possible that not all factors will be applicable in every case. The Panel considers these factors, along with any others the Panel deems relevant, in deciding the ultimate issue: whether the proposed string takes unfair advantage or unjustifiably impairs the distinctive character or the reputation of the Objector’s marks, or whether it otherwise creates an impermissible likelihood of confusion.

The language used in Section 3.5.2 of the Guidebook makes this dichotomy clear, for while the Panel is directed to “consider” the eight non-exclusive factors, it is mandated that the Panel “determine whether the potential use of the applied-for gTLD by the applicant takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the reputation of the objector’s ... trademark or service mark (“mark”) ... or unjustifiably impairs the distinctive character or the reputation of the objector’s mark ... or otherwise creates an impermissible likelihood of confusion between the applied-for gTLD and the objector’s mark or IGO name or acronym.”

Several panels have considered that for an objector to prevail, “there must be something more than mere advantage gained, or mere impairment, or mere likelihood of confusion.” See e.g., Right at Home v. Johnson Shareholdings, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0030; Defender Security Company v. Lifestyle Domain Holdings, Inc., WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0035. In the view of these panels, while the terms “unfair”, “unjustifiably,” and “impermissible” are not uniformly defined or understood in the trademark context, their use in this context of Section 3.5.2 of the Guidebook suggests that, in order to sustain the Objection, the Panel must find something untoward about the Respondent’s behavior or something intolerable about the Respondent being permitted to keep the string in dispute, even if the Respondent’s conduct or motives do not rise to the level of bad faith. Similar views have been expressed by several other Panels. See Defender Security Company v. Baxter Pike LLC, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0031; AC Webconnecting Holding B.V. v. United TLD Holdco Ltd, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0006.19

Based on the Panel’s consideration of the totality of the evidence and submissions in this proceeding, and as summarized below, the Panel concludes that the potential use of the applied-for gTLD by the Respondent does not take unfair advantage or unjustifiably impair the distinctive character or the reputation of the Objector’s marks, or otherwise create an impermissible likelihood of confusion between the applied-for gLTD and the Objector’s marks.

(i) takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the reputation of the Objector’s registered or unregistered trademarks or service mark

As discussed above, the Objector does not have enforceable trademark rights in “mail” standing alone. The record before this Panel reflects that the word “mail” is a generic term in relation to hard copy correspondence delivered by a postal service, postal services, and email. As was noted by the Panel in United States Postal Service v. Charleston Road Registry Inc., WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0045, under

19 In Defender Security Company v. Baxter Pike LLC, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0031, the panel concluded that the terms “unfair”, “unjustifiably” and “impermissible” imply some malfeasance on the part of the respondent or an obvious adverse impact upon the objector’s mark. The panel in AC Webconnecting Holding B.V. v. United TLD Holdco Ltd, WIPO Case No. LRO2013-0006, concluded that the terms “unfair advantage” and “unjustifiable impairment” in concern acts that have a commercial effect on a trademark which are undertaken in bad faith. The panel looked to the meaning given these concepts in WIPO’s Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet; and Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks. The panel concluded that a likelihood of confusion that is “impermissible” in the sense that it cannot be justified.
United States trademark law very little weight is given to generic terms, citing Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dept Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1988); American Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1986); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. Mass. 2008). Even assuming the potential use of the applied-for gTLD might result in the creation of second-level domain names by registrants seeking in some manner to exploit the Objector’s marks, the evidence and submissions in their totality do not support the conclusion that the potential use of the applied-for gTLD <.mail> by the Respondent will take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or reputation of the Objector’s marks. Objector has not met its burden of proof under this element of Section 3.5 of the Guidebook.

(ii) unjustifiably impairs the distinctive character or the reputation of the Objector’s mark

For similar reasons, even assuming that the potential use of the applied-for gTLD might result in the creation of second level domain names by registrants that in some manner could tarnish the Objector’s marks, the evidence and submissions in their totality do not support the conclusion that the potential use of the applied for gTLD <.mail> by the Respondent will unjustifiably impair the distinctive character or reputation of the Objector’s marks. Objector has not met its burden of proof under this element of Section 3.5 the Guidebook.

(iii) otherwise creates an impermissible likelihood of confusion between the applied-for gTLD and the Objector’s mark

The Panel has concluded as discussed earlier that the Respondent’s use of the applied-for TLD <.mail> is not likely to create confusion with the Objector’s marks as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the gTLD. Even assuming some confusion might arise from the potential use of the applied-for gTLD, for the Objector to prevail under this heading something more than a mere possibility that the Objector’s legal rights will be infringed by the Respondent’s use of the applied for gTLD string is required. The Objector has not met its burden under this element of Section 3.5 of the Guidebook to show that the potential use of the applied-for gTLD will create an impermissible likelihood of confusion.

7. Decision

In view of the foregoing, the Objection is rejected by the Panel.

[signed]

William R. Towns
Presiding Panelist

[signed]

Maxim H. Waldbaum
Panelist

[signed]

The Honourable Neil Brown Q.C
Panelist
Date: August 8, 2013